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INTRODUCTION
Hillary Transue was a high school sophomore when she was 
ordered to appear before Judge Mark Ciavarella regarding a fake 
Myspace account that she had created to mock the assistant principal 
of her school.1 Hillary and her mother had expected that Hillary 
would be given a “stern lecture” and would perhaps be ordered to 
complete community service as punishment.2 However, despite 
knowing that Hillary was a great student who had no other offenses 
on her record, Judge Ciavarella sentenced Hillary to three months of 
detention in a juvenile facility.3
Judge Ciavarella had earned a nickname of “Mr. Zero 
Tolerance” by the time that Hillary stood before him in 2007.4
Though statistics for juveniles being sent to detention facilities were 
dropping steadily across the country, the Luzerne County courthouse 
where Judge Ciavarella practiced saw an increase in children being 
taken from their families and sent to these facilities.5 Due to the 
frequency with which juveniles were sentenced by Judge Ciavarella, 
it became expected and anticipated that the children appearing before 
him would be separated from their parents and sent away.6
1. Joel Rose, After Scandal, New Rules for Juveniles in Pa. Courts, NPR
(Mar. 3, 2012, 4:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/03/147876810/after-scandal-
new-rules-for-juveniles-in-pa-courts; Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead 
Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A22. The 
Myspace page included a clear disclaimer that the site was intended as a joke and 
was not the actual webpage of the assistant vice principal. John D. “Jay” Elliott, A
Lawyer’s Guide to Luzerne County’s Kids for Cash Scandal, MARSH LAW FIRM’S
CHILDLAW BLOG (Aug. 5, 2010), 
http://www.childlaw.us/a_lawyers_guide_to_luzerne_cou/#.UxuA0F7sVxM.
2. Rose, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Ian Urbina, Despite Red Flags About Judges, a Kickback Scheme 
Flourished, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2009, at A1. In addition to sentencing Hillary to 
three months, Judge Ciavarella sentenced Kurt Kruger to five months in a juvenile 
facility in 2004 after Kruger was charged for acting as a lookout while his friend 
stole DVDs from a Walmart store. Id. Additionally, in 2006, DayQuawn Johnson 
was sentenced to “several days” in a juvenile detention facility for failing to appear 
as a witness, even though Johnson had never received notice of the hearing. Id.
5. Urbina & Hamill, supra note 1; Urbina, supra note 4. Additionally, 
children appearing in Judge Ciavarella’s courtroom “were 10 times as likely to 
receive out-of-home placement[s] as kids in other Pennsylvania counties.” Rose,
supra note 1.
6. Urbina, supra note 4. Judge Ciavarella also did not recommend that the 
children who appeared in his courtroom attain attorney representation. Id. When 
asked about this, Judge Ciavarella stated that he was not responsible for “‘spoon-
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Judge Ciavarella, along with Judge Conahan, another Luzerne 
County judge, was involved in a multi-million-dollar scheme 
intended to profit a private detention facility operated by Robert J. 
Powell, a friend of Judge Conahan.7 In exchange for $2.6 million, 
Judge Ciavarella assured Powell that his new private facility would 
receive “tens of millions of dollars that the county and the state 
would pay to house the delinquent juveniles.”8 Judge Ciavarella’s 
plan was successful, as Powell’s facility saw a large influx of 
juveniles once it was opened.9
After Judge Ciavarella’s illegal activities were realized,10 he 
and Judge Conahan were charged with racketeering, conspiracy, and 
other criminal charges, and have been sentenced to twenty-eight 
years and seventeen-and-a-half years in prison, respectively, for their 
actions.11 However, because Judge Ciavarella has absolute judicial 
immunity from civil recourse, the juveniles who were improperly 
sentenced by him are barred from bringing a civil suit against him 
and will fail to recover any monetary damages from him.12 Hillary 
feed[ing] people to do things in their life.’” Id. Likely because of his stance on this, 
“[f]rom 1997 to 2003, juveniles appeared before Judge Ciavarella without counsel at 
more than five times the state average, and from 2003 through 2007, that rate was 
around 10 times the state average.” Id.
7. Id. Powell had the initial idea to build the private facility, but was 
concerned that his investment would not be successful. Sarah L. Primrose, When 
Canaries Won’t Sing: The Failure of the Attorney Self-Reporting System in the 
“Cash-for-Kids” Scheme, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 139, 142 (2011). Therefore, the deal he 
made with the judges helped ensure that Powell would profit from his facility. Id.
8. Urbina, supra note 4.
9. Primrose, supra note 7, at 142-43. Additionally, the state-run facilities 
were bankrupted due, at least in part, to the lack of government funding. Id. Because 
the funding was allocated based upon the number of juveniles housed in the facility, 
the state-run facilities received far less money than anticipated, due primarily to 
Judge Ciavarella’s disproportionate sentencing of juveniles to Powell’s private 
facility. Id. at 143.
10. The State Department of Public Welfare auditors noticed that the county 
was consistently billing the state the same amount of money each month for juvenile 
detention facilities. Id. at 148. In most counties, the amount billed to the state 
fluctuates each month, depending on the number of juveniles sent to the facilities 
during that period. Id. This realization led to the discovery of Judge Ciavarella’s 
illegal activities. Id.
11. Rose, supra note 1; Jon Campisi, Developer in ‘Kids for Cash’ Judicial 
Scandal Agrees to Settle Outstanding Civil Cases for $17.75 Million, PA. REC. (Dec. 
20, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://pennrecord.com/news/4296-developer-in-kids-for-cash-
judicial-scandal-agrees-to-settle-outstanding-civil-cases-for-17-75-million.
12. Associated Press, Pennsylvania: Partial Immunity, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
21, 2009), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9904E6D81131F932A15
752C1A96F9C8B63.
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will forever have to live with the fear and humiliation that she felt in 
Judge Ciavarella’s courtroom, after being handcuffed and taken 
away from her family, but she will never receive damages from 
Judge Ciavarella stemming from his violation of her rights.13
In 1872, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of 
Bradley v. Fisher,14 in which the Court detailed the doctrine of 
absolute judicial immunity and the requirements necessary for the 
immunity to apply.15 Absolute judicial immunity has been further 
developed since 1872, but many of the same requirements still apply, 
and, today, judges are still considered absolutely immune from 
liability under the guidelines set forth in Bradley.16 Under absolute 
judicial immunity, judges are provided with complete protection for 
any civil action brought against the judge for any judicial act taken, 
as long as the judge does not act in a clear absence of all 
jurisdiction.17 Absolute judicial immunity, however, provides judges 
with protection that is far too broad in scope.18
Instead of providing a blanket protection for each judge, a 
limitation should be placed on absolute judicial immunity from civil 
recourse.19 This limitation would disqualify a judge from being 
protected by absolute judicial immunity if the judicial conduct is 
sanctionable under the state or federal version of the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct and if the judge acted with malice.20 If these 
elements are met, the judge would be unable to assert absolute 
judicial immunity as a defense and would be subject to civil suit in 
order to compensate the individuals victimized by the judge’s 
actions.21 If, however, the judge does not act in a manner for which 
he or she could be sanctioned or the judge does not act with malice, 
then the judge should be able to offer absolute judicial immunity as a 
bar from civil action.22
Part I discusses in further detail the history of absolute judicial 
immunity, beginning with an examination of the policy 
13. Rose, supra note 1. Hundreds of the juveniles sentenced by Judge 
Ciavarella did, however, have their records expunged. Urbina, supra note 4.
14. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872).
15. Id. at 351; SHELDON H. NAHMOD, MICHAEL L. WELLS & THOMAS A.
EATON, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 416 (3d ed. 2010).
16. 80 U.S. at 351; see infra Part I.
17. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra Section I.B.
19. See infra Section III.A.
20. See infra Section III.A.
21. See infra Section III.A.
22. See infra Section III.A.
Giving New Meaning to “Justice for All” 153
considerations asserted by advocates of the doctrine and continuing 
with the earliest British case law. This Part concludes with a 
discussion of cases from the twenty-first century in which absolute 
judicial immunity was considered. Part II dissects the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct, which serves as a set of guidelines to which judges 
are supposed to abide and as recommendations to each state as to 
what judicial activity should be sanctionable. Finally, Part III further 
develops the proposal of amending absolute judicial immunity to 
include this limitation, which is determined by whether the judge 
acts in a way that can be sanctionable and with malice. Part III 
concludes with a reflection of the policy concerns that have left 
absolute judicial immunity relatively unscathed throughout the 
centuries and indicates why this proposal is necessary to ensure that 
no plaintiff is left without relief when a judge violates his rights.
I. ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY THROUGH THE YEARS
Absolute judicial immunity is one in a series of immunities 
provided to four main classes of individuals: judges, legislators, 
prosecutors, and witnesses.23 When a member of one of these classes 
can successfully show that absolute immunity should apply, the 
individual is protected from civil liability, even if the individual has 
acted in such a way that he would otherwise be liable for his 
activities.24 Additionally, the individual does not need to defend 
against the civil action, as the immunity can be asserted in the early 
part of an action and can lead to an immediate dismissal of the civil 
case.25
Advocates for absolute immunity defend the doctrine with 
three primary policy considerations: deterrence, inhibition, and 
distraction.26 First, as applied to the judiciary, absolute immunity 
prevents deterrence from government service by protecting judges 
from frivolous lawsuits based on decisions made from the bench.27
Second, absolute immunity prevents inhibition in the performance of 
23. See generally Robert F. Brown, Individual Immunity Defenses Under 
Section 1983, in SWORD AND SHIELD: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983
LITIGATION 445, 445-63 (Mary Massaron Ross & Edwin P. Voss, Jr. eds., 3d ed. 
2006).
24. See generally id.
25. See generally id.
26. See id. at 451.
27. Interview with Philip Pucillo, Lecturer in Law, Mich. State Univ. Coll. 
of Law, in E. Lansing, Mich. (Nov. 28, 2012). See generally Brown, supra note 23.
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judicial functions by alleviating any concern that a judge may be 
sued based on her judicial decisions.28 Third, absolute immunity 
prevents distractions in the performance of judicial functions by 
preventing judges from being absent from judicial obligations while 
defending themselves in civil lawsuits.29 These three policy concerns 
have helped propel absolute judicial immunity through the centuries, 
beginning first in British common law and continuing through the 
American jurisprudence system.30
A. Origins of Absolute Judicial Immunity
Absolute judicial immunity, which stems originally from 
British common law,31 has navigated through the American judicial 
system while remaining relatively unchanged.32 Over the course of 
many centuries, the doctrine has been clarified substantially, but it 
has never been significantly altered.33
One of the earliest appearances of absolute judicial immunity 
occurred in Britain in 1607.34 In Floyd & Barker, Lord Coke 
discussed the scope of immunity available to judges and the 
immunity’s underlying rationale.35 Lord Coke stated in his opinion 
that judges should not be “question[ed] for any supposed corruption . 
. . except it be before the King himself; for they are only to make an 
account to God and the King, and not to answer to any suggestion in 
the Star Chamber; for this would tend to the scandal and subversion 
of all justice.”36 Floyd made clear that a judge had immunity for all 
acts performed while functioning as a judge because the only person 
to whom a judge would need to answer was the King.37 This case 
28. Interview with Philip Pucillo, supra note 27. See generally Brown, 
supra note 23.
29. Interview with Philip Pucillo, supra note 27. See generally Brown, 
supra note 23.
30. See infra Section I.A.
31. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 34-71 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 34-71 and accompanying text.
34. Floyd & Barker, (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber); 5 Co. Rep. 
23.
35. Id. at 1305-07. In this case, Lord Coke, acting on behalf of the King’s
Court, granted a judge immunity from a civil action brought against him. Id.;
Timothy M. Stengel, Comment, Absolute Judicial Immunity Makes Absolutely No 
Sense: An Argument for an Exception to Judicial Immunity, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 1071, 
1076 n.45 (2012).
36. Floyd, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1307.
37. Id.; Stengel, supra note 35, at 1076 n.45.
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became notable in the United States years later, as it is most often 
cited when examining the roots of absolute judicial immunity.38
The first case in which the United States Supreme Court 
discussed absolute judicial immunity and its scope was Randall v. 
Brigham in 1868.39 In this case, the plaintiff, Randall, was brought 
before the defendant, Judge Brigham, after one of Randall’s clients 
brought a suit against him.40 Though Randall settled the discrepancy 
with his client outside of court, Judge Brigham determined Randall’s 
actions were “unconscionable” and ordered that Randall no longer be 
permitted to practice law in the state of Massachusetts.41 Randall 
then sued Judge Brigham for unlawful removal and sought monetary 
relief.42
The Court, in its opinion, discussed the importance of absolute 
judicial immunity in the American judicial system.43 The Court 
clearly articulated that judges require the ability to make decisions 
freely—without needing to consider the personal effects of those 
decisions—in order for the judicial process to work properly.44 The 
Court also determined that judges “are not liable to civil actions for 
their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their 
jurisdiction, unless perhaps where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, 
are done maliciously or corruptly.”45 This proved to be an important 
distinction, as the Randall Court did not resolve whether a judge, 
who acts maliciously or corruptly, while also acting in excess of his 
or her jurisdiction, may be disqualified from claiming absolute 
judicial immunity.46 The Court accentuated the point that judges can 
be sanctioned or even impeached when their actions are “faithless,”
“corrupt,” “dishonest,” or “partial.”47 However, judges would not be 
responsible “to private parties in civil actions for their judicial acts, 
38. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 533, 536 (1869); Bradley v. 
Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347-48 (1872).
39. 74 U.S. 523.
40. Id. at 525-26.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 526.
43. Id. at 536.
44. Id. The Court elaborated on this point by stating that judges would be 
influenced by personal considerations “if, whenever they err in judgment as to their 
jurisdiction, . . . they may be subjected to prosecution at the instance of every party 
imagining himself aggrieved, and be called upon in a civil action in another tribunal
. . . to vindicate their acts.” Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 537.
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however injurious may be those acts, and however much they may 
deserve condemnation, unless perhaps where the acts are palpably in 
excess of the jurisdiction of the judges, and are done maliciously or 
corruptly.”48
Three years later, the Supreme Court again addressed the 
application of absolute judicial immunity.49 In Bradley v. Fisher, the 
plaintiff, Bradley, tried a case before the defendant, Judge Fisher.50
Bradley and Judge Fisher exchanged a number of insults during the 
course of the trial.51 After the trial concluded, Judge Fisher executed 
an order disbarring Bradley from practicing before the Supreme 
Court of the District of Columbia.52 Bradley sued Judge Fisher and 
sought monetary relief stemming from Judge Fisher’s actions.53
The Court once again expressed adamant support for absolute 
judicial immunity and detailed exactly why, and in what situations, 
the immunity should apply.54 In addition to restating the importance 
of judicial freedom in the decision-making process,55 Bradley
clarified the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity in two primary 
ways.56 First, the opinion articulated the distinction between a 
judicial act completed in excess of jurisdiction and a judicial act 
48. Id.
49. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
50. Id. at 344.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 345.
54. Id. at 347-54. Primarily because of this detail, Bradley is still used as 
the determinative case for issues concerning absolute judicial immunity. NAHMOD,
WELLS & EATON, supra note 15, at 416. 
55. The Court used much of the same reasoning in Bradley that had already 
been presented in Randall. See Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347; Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 
(7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1869). For instance, and perhaps one of the most important 
consistencies from these cases, the Court once again drew out the importance of 
judicial freedom from inhibition. Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347; Randall, 74 U.S. at 536. 
In Bradley, the Court stated that
it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper 
administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority 
vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without 
apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to 
every one who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge, 
would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would 
destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either 
respectable or useful.
80 U.S. at 347. Similarly, in Randall, the Court stated that judges must be free from 
influence of the public and free from fear of reprisal from distressed parties. 74 U.S. 
at 536.
56. 80 U.S. at 351-52.
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completed with a clear absence of jurisdiction.57 After providing a 
definition and an example for each term,58 the Court explained that 
judges are immune from all civil liability unless they have acted in 
“the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”59 Though the distinction 
between these two terms is difficult to ascertain,60 this assertion has 
proven crucial in contemporary cases asserting the applicability of 
absolute judicial immunity.61
Second, the Court explained that motive could never be 
considered in absolute judicial immunity scenarios, and thus the 
immunity would apply even if the judge acted maliciously or 
corruptly.62 This determination significantly narrowed the Court’s 
decision in Randall, as the Court had previously left open that 
perhaps judges could lose their protection if they acted in a clear 
absence of jurisdiction and acted maliciously or corruptly.63
However, the Court in Bradley determined that malice was not 
sufficient for judges to lose the protection of absolute judicial 
57. Id.
58. Presumably understanding that the distinction between the terms 
“excess of jurisdiction” and “clear absence of all jurisdiction” was unclear, the Court
provided an example to illustrate each situation. Id. For a judge to act in excess of 
jurisdiction, the Court explained that a judge in a criminal court with general 
jurisdiction over all criminal cases brought before him would still reap the benefits 
of absolute judicial immunity if the judge proclaims the disputed act to be a “public 
offence,” after which the judge proceeded with the arrest and trial of the accused 
party, but later it is discovered that the act was in fact a criminal act by law. Id. at 
352. Because the judge had general jurisdiction over all criminal activity presented 
within his courtroom, this would merely be an instance of excess of jurisdiction, and 
the judge would be provided with absolute judicial immunity. Id. Conversely, a
judicial act is completed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction if the judge of a 
probate court, with authority to preside over wills and estates, were “to try parties 
for public offences, jurisdiction over the subject of offences being entirely wanting 
in the court, and this being necessarily known to its judge.” Id. The judge would not 
receive the protection provided through the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity
for this clear indiscretion. Id. However, these examples prove to be less helpful in 
more modern cases when the questionable judicial acts occur in chambers or in more 
administrative decision-making scenarios. See infra notes 73-81 and accompanying 
text.
59. Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351.
60. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
61. See generally Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Mireles v. 
Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
Notably, the distinction made in Bradley, though later clarified, has never been 
significantly amended. See generally NAHMOD, WELLS & EATON, supra note 15, at 
416.
62. Bradley, 80 U.S. at 354.
63. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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immunity.64 Specifically, the Court focused on the likely 
consequences of an exception that was determinative of the 
aggrieved party proving malice or corruption.65 In the opinion, the 
Court expressed that
[i]f civil actions could be maintained in such cases against the judge, 
because the losing party should see fit to allege in his complaint that the 
acts of the judge were done with partiality, or maliciously, or corruptly, 
the protection essential to judicial independence would be entirely swept 
away. Few persons sufficiently irritated to institute an action against a 
judge for his judicial acts would hesitate to ascribe any character to the 
acts which would be essential to the maintenance of the action.66
In sum, the Court determined that malice or corruption could nearly 
always be alleged in cases in which absolute judicial immunity was a 
factor.67 Judges might, therefore, make decisions only after 
pondering how the decisions may be construed to be malicious or 
corrupt.68 Additionally, the Court emphasized that judges who could 
not be held civilly liable in light of absolute judicial immunity could 
still face sanctions or impeachment.69
B. Modern Case Law Featuring Absolute Judicial Immunity
Though the Court decided the Floyd, Randall, and Bradley
cases more than a century ago, these cases are still vital to the 
consideration of contemporary cases involving the application of 
absolute judicial immunity.70 Very few changes have been made to 
absolute judicial immunity since Bradley, but some cases have been 
sufficiently important and unique to have the doctrine reconsidered 
by the Supreme Court.71 Since 1967, the Supreme Court has 
considered a number of notable cases that discuss the extent of the 
64. 80 U.S. at 354.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 348.
67. Id. at 354. The Court drew extensively from Floyd in making this 
determination. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. Specifically, the Court 
asserted that “[t]he purity of their motives cannot . . . be the subject of judicial 
inquiry. This was adjudged in the case of Floyd . . . where it was laid down that the 
judges . . . could not be drawn in question for any supposed corruption impeaching 
the verity of their records, except before the king himself.” Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347-
48.
68. Bradley, 80 U.S. at 354.
69. Id.
70. See generally Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Forrester v. 
White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam).
71. 80 U.S. 335. 
Giving New Meaning to “Justice for All” 159
immunity,72 three of which are especially relevant to the proposed 
limitation.
1. Stump v. Sparkman
The Supreme Court considered the applicability of absolute 
judicial immunity in 1978 in Stump v. Sparkman.73 Ora McFarlin, 
mother of fifteen-year-old Linda Sparkman, brought a petition to 
Judge Stump seeking his approval to have Sparkman undergo a tubal 
ligation, which would permanently sterilize her.74 McFarlin stated in 
the petition that Sparkman was “‘somewhat retarded’”75 and had 
been spending the night out with men.76 Citing concern for her
daughter’s well-being, McFarlin requested that Judge Stump sign a 
petition that would permit the procedure.77 Without requesting 
further proof of McFarlin’s allegations, Judge Stump agreed to the 
petition, which not only authorized the surgery, but also indemnified 
the surgeon and the hospital where the procedure was to be 
performed.78 A few weeks later, Sparkman was taken to the hospital 
under the pretense of having her appendix removed, and the tubal 
ligation was performed.79 Only years later when Sparkman was 
married and trying to conceive did she finally learn that she had been 
sterilized.80 Following this realization, Sparkman and her husband 
entered suit against Judge Stump.81
The Supreme Court found that Judge Stump’s action was a 
judicial act under the definition provided in Bradley and that Judge 
72. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Butz v. Economou, 438 
U.S. 478 (1978); Stump, 435 U.S. 349; Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980);
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Forrester, 484 U.S. 219; Mireles, 502 
U.S. 9.
73. 435 U.S. 349.
74. Id. at 351.
75. Id. Despite this assertion, Sparkman progressed with her class in school. 
Id.
76. Id. Other than the declaration of these statements in the petition, 
McFarlin offered no further proof that these statements were in fact accurate. Id. &
n.1.
77. Id. For a description of this procedure, see Sterilization for Women 
(Tubal Sterilization), PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/birth-control/sterilization-women-
4248.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
78. Stump, 435 U.S. at 352-53.
79. Id. at 353.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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Stump had jurisdiction to consider McFarlin’s petition.82 In making 
this decision, the Court drew heavily from Bradley in discussing the 
importance of absolute judicial immunity.83 Specifically, the Court 
insisted that
the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the 
issue is the immunity of the judge. A judge will not be deprived of 
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, 
or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only 
when he has acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”84
The Court determined that, because there was no express 
provision of Indiana law prohibiting Judge Stump from considering a 
parental sterilization petition, Judge Stump had jurisdiction to 
consider the petition.85 The Court then explained that Judge Stump’s 
action constituted a judicial act because it met two separate, but 
related, factors.86 First, a judicial act must be a “function normally 
performed by a judge.”87 Second, a judicial act is one in which the 
parties “dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.”88 The Court 
insisted that, because McFarlin approached Judge Stump for his 
affirmation of the petition due to the fact that he was a judge, his 
action must be considered a judicial act.89 The Court concluded the 
opinion by explaining that, though parties are sometimes injured by 
82. Id. at 357-58.
83. Id. at 355-56 (noting that the Court’s opinion in Bradley extensively 
discussed the importance of judicial freedom in the decision-making process, free 
from any thought of possible personal consequences).
84. Id. at 356-57 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351
(1872)).
85. Id. at 357-58. The Court specifically considered the Indiana statute that 
provided jurisdiction to Judge Stump, which granted him “jurisdiction over the 
settlement of estates and over guardianships, appellate jurisdiction as conferred by 
law, and jurisdiction over ‘all other causes, matters and proceedings where exclusive 
jurisdiction thereof is not conferred by law upon some other court, board or 
officer.’” Id. at 357 (quoting IND. CODE § 33-4-4-3 (1975)). Additionally, the 
Supreme Court considered the Indiana statute that granted permission for the 
sterilization of only institutionalized persons, but “otherwise contained no express 
authority for judicial approval of tubal ligations.” Id. at 358. However, the Supreme 
Court ultimately determined that, because there was no express provision 
prohibiting an Indiana judge from considering a parental petition for the sterilization 
of a child, Judge Stump had jurisdiction. Id. at 357-58.
86. Id. at 361-62. However, Bradley does not actually provide a definition 
or a test that should be used to determine whether an act by a judge should be 
considered a judicial act. Id. at 365 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
87. Id. at 362 (majority opinion).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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the actions of a judge, absolute judicial immunity does not, and 
should not, consider fairness and potential harm done.90 Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court upheld Judge Stump’s absolute immunity.91
2. Forrester v. White
The Supreme Court again considered absolute judicial 
immunity in Forrester v. White, which presented the question of 
whether a judge should receive the protection of the immunity when 
performing an administrative act.92 Judge White, a circuit judge in 
the Illinois, had the authority under Illinois law to hire and fire
probation officers,93 and hired Cynthia Forrester as a probation 
officer.94 Forrester was ultimately fired from her position and 
brought suit against Judge White, claiming that Judge White’s 
actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 
1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.95
In granting certiorari in this case, the Court hoped to further 
clarify situations in which absolute judicial immunity should apply.96
As the Court asserted, most of the difficulties associated with 
absolute judicial immunity are caused by the lack of clarity in 
“draw[ing] the line” between an act done by a judge and a judicial 
act, as only judicial actions are protected by absolute judicial 
immunity.97 Despite the fact that administrative decisions do play a 
90. Id. at 363. The Court quoted Bradley in stating that
[d]espite the unfairness to litigants that sometimes results, the doctrine of 
judicial immunity is thought to be in the best interests of “the proper 
administration of justice . . . [, for it allows] a judicial officer, in exercising 
the authority vested in him [to] be free to act upon his own convictions, 
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.”
Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 335, 347 (1872)).
91. Id. at 364. In light of the Court’s finding that Judge Stump was 
protected by absolute judicial immunity, Sparkman and her husband were unable to 
collect any damages from Judge Stump. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
92. 484 U.S. 219, 230 (1988).
93. Id. at 221. The applicable Illinois law that granted Judge White the 
ability to hire and fire probation officers at will has been repealed. Id. (citing ILL.
REV. STAT., ch. 38, ¶ 204-1 (1979)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 225. 
97. Id. at 227. Further, “[t]his Court has never undertaken to articulate a 
precise and general definition of the class of acts entitled to immunity. The decided 
cases, however, suggest an intelligible distinction between judicial acts and the 
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substantial role in the entirety of the judicial process, the Court 
determined that administrative actions, when completed by judges, 
do not allow the judge to be protected by immunity.98
Given the facts of Forrester, the Court determined that Judge 
White was acting in an administrative capacity when he fired 
Forrester.99 Though his act “may have been quite important in 
providing the necessary conditions of a sound adjudicative system,” 
the Court reasoned that 
a judge who hires or fires a probation officer cannot meaningfully be 
distinguished from a district attorney who hires and fires assistant district 
attorneys, or indeed from any other Executive Branch official who is 
responsible for making such employment decisions. Such decisions, like 
personnel decisions made by judges, are often crucial to the efficient 
operation of public institutions (some of which are at least as important as 
the courts), yet no one suggests that they give rise to absolute immunity 
from liability in damages.100
In rejecting the application of absolute judicial immunity, the Court 
addressed the two main reasons monetary damages are awarded in 
civil suits.101 First, monetary damages compensate the victim for the 
“wrongful actions” of the defendant.102 Second, and arguably more 
importantly, monetary damages discourage illegal behavior from this 
specific defendant and other individuals who may otherwise act 
similarly in the future.103 Though there have been strong arguments 
made for the protection of hiring and firing of employees by 
judges,104 the Court nevertheless determined that this administrative 
action would not cause extreme inhibition, as would judicial acts 
administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be 
assigned by law to perform.” Id.
98. Id. at 228.
99. Id. at 229.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 223.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provided a scenario that 
illustrated this problem. Id. at 229 (citing Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 658 (7th 
Cir. 1986)). It stated that this could occur when “‘[a] judge loses confidence in his 
probation officer, but hesitates to fire him because of the threat of litigation. He then 
retains the officer, in which case the parties appearing before the court are the 
victims, because the quality of the judge’s decision-making will decline.’” Id.
(quoting Forrester, 792 F.2d at 658). However, the Supreme Court responded to this 
hypothetical scenario by reasoning that a judge could reassign the duty of firing the 
employee if the judge were too burdened by the possibility of personal liability. Id.
at 229-30. 
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protected by immunity.105 This case, therefore, is especially notable 
as it limits the application of absolute judicial immunity.
3. Mireles v. Waco
Three years after the Court decided Forrester, it once again 
granted certiorari to an absolute judicial immunity case.106 In this 
case, Howard Waco, a Los Angeles County public defender, filed 
suit against Judge Mireles, a judge of the California Superior Court, 
and two police officers.107 Judge Mireles had ordered the two officers 
“‘to forcibly and with excessive force seize and bring [Waco] into 
[Judge Mireles’s] courtroom’” after Waco failed to appear in court.108
According to the petition for certiorari,109 Judge Mireles “‘knowingly 
and deliberately approved and ratified each of the . . . acts’ of the 
police officers.”110 Waco, in bringing suit against Judge Mireles, 
sought punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages.111
The Court stated, as was well established at this point, that 
absolute judicial immunity, like other forms of immunity, is intended 
to protect officials not only from monetary damages, but also from 
the hassle and embarrassment of suit.112 This principle, in the Court’s 
opinion, was well worth a restatement, as it immediately dismissed 
as immaterial Waco’s claims that Judge Mireles acted knowingly and 
maliciously.113 The Court noted that there are only two incidents 
where absolute judicial immunity does not apply: (1) where the 
actions of the judge are not considered to be judicial acts; and (2) 
where the judge acts in a complete absence of all jurisdiction.114
105. Id. at 230. In making this holding, the Court did not consider what 
actions should be taken next against Judge White, but rather only remanded the case 
for further proceedings. Id.
106. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam). However, the Court 
deemed Mireles to be sufficiently straightforward to decide the case per curiam. Id.
107. Id. at 10.
108. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at B-3, Mireles, 502 U.S. 9 
(No. 91-311)). 
109. The allegations presented by Waco in his complaint must be considered 
true in this case, as the case is an appeal of a motion to dismiss. Id. at 11. Therefore, 
all decisions rendered in this case are based on the assumed accuracy and 
truthfulness of Waco’s complaint, as is standard for an appeal of this nature. Id.
110. Id. at 10 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 108, at B-
4). 
111. Id.
112. Id. at 11 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). 
113. Id. (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). 
114. Id. at 11-12. 
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Because ordering police officers to bring an individual to court is a 
normal judicial function, the Court determined that Judge Mireles’s 
order was a judicial act under the definition recognized by the Court, 
even though it allegedly involved excessive force.115 Though the 
Court seemed to realize that this may be an unpopular decision, it 
explained that if Judge Mireles’s action had not been considered a 
judicial act, then, by extension, absolute judicial immunity would be 
inapplicable to any mistake made by a judge.116 This, if it were to 
become a reality, would once again breed inhibition in the court 
system, a clear prospect that the Supreme Court has avoided for over 
a century.117 The Court also specified that, even though the act was 
completed by the police officers, the judge’s order was still a judicial 
act.118
The Court discussed, briefly, whether Judge Mireles acted 
within his jurisdiction, in excess of his jurisdiction, or in complete 
absence of his jurisdiction.119 Without providing much in the way of 
explanatory support, the Court determined that Judge Mireles acted 
in excess of his jurisdiction, as he had the jurisdiction to order police
officers to collect Waco and deliver him to Judge Mireles’s 
courtroom, but he did not have the jurisdiction to order the police 
officers to use unnecessary force.120 Unfortunately, the lack of 
explanation in making this determination may cause confusion in
future cases, but the Court seemed satisfied that Judge Mireles’s 
order did not cross into an action done in complete absence of all 
115. Id. at 12. Specifically, the Court stated that “we look to the particular 
act’s relation to a general function normally performed by a judge, in this case the 
function of directing police officers to bring counsel in a pending case before the 
court.” Id. at 13. 
116. Id. at 12-13 (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 362 (1978)).
117. See generally Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 534-35
(1869); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 356-57 (1872); Stump, 435 U.S. 
at 363-64; Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988).
118. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13. The Court took this distinction from Forrester
and stated that
[a]s Forrester instructs, it is “the nature of the function performed, not the 
identity of the actor who performed it, that inform[s] our immunity 
analysis.” A judge’s direction to an executive officer to bring counsel 
before the court is no more executive in character than a judge’s issuance 
of a warrant for an executive officer to search a home.
Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 
229). 
119. Id.
120. Id.
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jurisdiction.121 With this final decision, the Court concluded that 
Judge Mireles should receive the protection of absolute judicial 
immunity.122 Following the limitation imposed by Forrester only 
three years earlier, Mireles helped confirm that the doctrine of 
absolute judicial immunity is still alive and well in the American 
judicial system.
II. THE DUTY OF JUDGES TO ACT ETHICALLY
In order to fully understand the responsibilities of judges to act 
ethically and without bias, it is prudent to consider the regulations 
that govern the judiciary. The American Bar Association (ABA) has 
historically issued the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (Code), 
which has been adapted throughout the past century.123 Though the 
Code is not enforceable by the ABA, state court judges must adhere 
to their state’s version of the Code, which is imposed by the highest 
court in the state.124 Most states have drafted a very similar version of 
the Code to which their judges must abide.125 Federal judges must 
adhere to the Code of Conduct for Federal Judges.126
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Am. Bar Ass’n Ctr. for Prof’l Responsibility, ABA Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct (2011 Edition), ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_
code_of_judicial_conduct.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
124. LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW 624 (3d ed. 2012). Each individual state has created judicial 
disciplinary commissions that review allegedly inappropriate judicial behavior. Id. at 
625. Further, these commissions also have the ability to sanction the state judges. Id.
125. Id. at 624.
126. Id. (citing 175 F.R.D. 363 (1998)). The Code of Conduct for Federal 
Judges includes canons similar to those in the ABA’s Code. Compare 175 F.R.D. 
363, with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2011). Federal judges can also face 
sanctions for violating the Code of Conduct for Federal Judges, but cannot be 
impeached without a formal congressional impeachment process. LERMAN &
SCHRAG, supra note 124, at 625. Notably, however, Supreme Court justices are 
immune from the Code of Conduct for Federal Judges, which leaves the justices free 
from ethical scrutiny. Id. Recently, critics have lobbied for the inclusion of Supreme 
Court justices to the list of judges bound by the Code of Conduct for Federal Judges. 
R. Jeffrey Smith, Professors Ask Congress for an Ethics Code for Supreme Court,
WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/law-group-
seeks-ethics-code-for-supreme-court/2011/02/23/AB8rKgI_story.html. 
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A. Historical Background of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
Despite the many ethical problems that plagued the judiciary in 
the early years of this nation,127 the ABA did not set forth ethical 
rules for judges until 1924.128 The first version of the Code was 
written to clarify behaviors that were deemed inappropriate for all 
judges.129 Specifically, to demonstrate this intent, the 1924 Code’s 
Preamble stated that the provisions of the Code were to be construed 
as “suggest[ions of] a proper guide and reminder for judges, and 
[indications of] what the people have a right to expect from them.”130
Though the provisions ranged in topics from constitutional 
obligations131 and judicial opinions132 to promptness133 and court 
127. Before the formation of the Code, courts generally used biblical 
passages of ethics as a bar that judges were expected to meet. See Raymond J. 
McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impropriety: What the Public 
Sees Is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914, 1920-21 (2010) (discussing the 
role of Saint Paul’s teachings to the Thessalonians stressing the avoidance of evil, 
including the mere appearance of evil).
128. The ABA determined that ethical rules for judges were necessary after 
Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, who was a federal circuit judge, was also 
appointed Commissioner of Major League Baseball. Id. at 1921-22. Judge Landis 
held the two positions concurrently and received a sizeable income from each, 
which was troublesome to many attorneys at the time. Id. at 1923. However, there 
were no known laws or regulations that prohibited Judge Landis from occupying 
both positions at the same time, and thus he was permitted to serve in both positions 
simultaneously. DAVID PIETRUSZA, JUDGE AND JURY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE 
KENESAW MOUNTAIN LANDIS 197 (1998). Specifically, Attorney General Palmer 
stated that “[t]here seems to be nothing as a matter of general law which would 
prohibit a district judge from receiving additional compensation for other than 
strictly judicial service, such as acting as . . . commissioner.” Id. Distressed with this 
outcome, the ABA insisted that Judge Landis’s dual employment brought an 
appearance of distrust and misconduct to the judiciary. AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF 
THE FORTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING 61-67 (1921). This issue of public perception 
had been recognized by other courts previously. See In re George A. Davis, 15 Haw. 
377, 390 (1904) (Galbraith, J., dissenting). For instance, the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii stressed that “[t]he law carefully guards not only against actual abuse, but 
even against the appearance of evil, from which doubt can justly be cast upon the 
impartiality of judges, or respect for their decisions may be impaired.” Id. (citing In 
re Dodge & Stevenson Mfg. Co., 77 N.Y. 101, 110 (1879)).
129. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924). 
130. Id. pmbl.
131. See id. (expressing in part that “[i]t is the duty of all judges in the 
United States to support the federal Constitution and that of the state whose laws 
they administer”).
132. See id. Canon 19 (suggesting in part that “[i]n disposing of controverted 
cases, a judge should indicate the reasons for his action in an opinion showing that 
he has not disregarded or overlooked serious arguments of counsel”).
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organization,134 the overall theme of the 1924 Code seemed to stress 
the appearance of integrity within the judiciary.135 Further, the Code
emphasized the need for judges to remain unbiased in business 
relationships and other settings in order to ensure fair and just 
decisions.136
Though the Code remained intact and unchanged for nearly 
fifty years, it has been amended seven times in the last four 
decades.137 Through the adaptations, the Code has remained 
generally consistent, especially in the focus on the need for positive 
public perception of the judicial system.138 The 1972 adaptation of 
the Code only became necessary after a 1969 indiscretion by Justice 
133. See id. Canon 7 (stating in part that judges “should be prompt in the 
performance of [their] judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, jurors 
and attorneys is of value”).
134. See id. Canon 8 (explaining in part that a judge should “not tolerate 
abuses and neglect by clerks[] and other assistants who are sometimes prone to 
presume too much upon his good natured acquiescence by reason of friendly 
association with him”).
135. See generally CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS. For instance, the fourth 
provision, entitled “Avoidance of Impropriety,” states “[a] judge’s official conduct 
should be free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety; he should avoid 
infractions of law; and his personal behavior, not only upon the Bench and in the 
performance of judicial duties, but also in his every day life, should be beyond 
reproach.” Id. Canon 4.
136. Id. Canon 32 (stating that judges “should not accept any presents or 
favors from litigants, or from lawyers practi[c]ing before [them] or from others 
whose interests are likely to be submitted to [them] for judgment”); see also id.
Canon 29 (expressing that judges “should abstain from performing or taking part in 
any judicial act in which [their] personal interests are involved”); Id. Canon 26
(“[Judges] should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which 
are apt to be involved in litigation in the court; and, after [their] accession to the 
Bench, [they] should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a 
period sufficient to enable [them] to dispose of them without serious loss. It is 
desirable that [judges] should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all 
relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp 
or bias [their] judgment, or prevent [their] impartial attitude of mind in the 
administration of [their] judicial duties.”). 
137. The Code was amended in 1990, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2007, and, most 
recently, in 2010. Am. Bar Ass’n Ctr. for Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 123. In 
1972, the ABA changed the name of the Code from the Canons of Judicial Conduct 
to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2011).
138. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990) (stating 
that “[a] judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of 
the judge’s activities”), with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007) 
(expressing that “[a] judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, 
and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety”).
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Fortas, a then-sitting member of the Supreme Court.139 Even though 
Justice Fortas had not committed a crime, his actions caused public 
disdain for the American judiciary system, centered primarily on the 
Supreme Court.140 In the scandal’s aftermath, the ABA created a 
committee to review the 1924 Code to ensure that the Code put forth 
sufficiently stringent regulations to keep the public’s perception of 
the judiciary as favorable as possible.141 Most notable about the 1972 
version of the Code was the ABA’s commitment to make the Code 
more of an enforceable set of canons, rather than “aspirational”
suggestions of judicial conduct.142 For instance, the Code required 
recusal for judges in four specific circumstances,143 as opposed to the 
139. Justice Abe Fortas received a compensation of $20,000 for his help with 
the Wolfson Family Foundation. Ian Millhiser, Justices Have Been Forced to Resign 
for Doing What Clarence Thomas Has Done, THINKPROGRESS (June 19, 2011, 1:19 
PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/06/19/248151/clarence-thomas-
resign/?mobile=nc. Though Justice Fortas’s actions were legal, he brought harm to 
the reputation of the judiciary and resigned soon after the scandal was made public. 
Id.
140. McKoski, supra note 127, at 1927-28.
141. Id. at 1926.
142. Id. at 1928 n.84 (stating that “‘[t]he 1972 Code thus effectively 
strengthened the commitment to regulating appearances as a means to promote 
public confidence in the courts by making its rules enforceable’” (quoting Charles 
Gardner Geyh, Roscoe Pound and the Future of the Good Government Movement,
48 S. TEX. L. REV. 871, 879 (2007))).
143. Id. at 1929-30 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3
(1972)). The 1972 Code stated:
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to instances where: 
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or 
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding; 
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer 
with whom he previously practiced law served during such 
association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or 
such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
. . . .
(c) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or 
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in 
the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, 
or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the 
outcome of the proceeding; 
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of 
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee 
of a party; 
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1924 Code, which only required recusal in two situations.144 In 
accentuating different circumstances in which a judge should recuse 
himself, the 1972 Code continued to consider “[a]ppearances [as] the 
heart of judicial ethics.”145 Since the 1972 revision, the Code has 
remained largely unchanged, though it has been officially updated 
six times.146
B. The Current State of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
The ABA most recently amended the Code in August of 
2010.147 The Preamble to this current version emphasizes the 
importance of “[a]n independent, fair and impartial judiciary” for our 
country, “based upon the principle that an independent, impartial, 
and competent judiciary, composed of men and women of integrity, 
will interpret and apply the law that governs our society.”148 In order 
for the strength and legitimacy of the judiciary to remain intact, 
“[j]udges should maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times, 
and avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in 
their professional and personal lives. They should aspire at all times 
to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in 
their independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence.”149
Having set the backdrop for ensuring the importance of judicial 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1972).
144. The 1924 Code stated that a judge could not “act in a controversy where 
a near relative is a party,” nor could a judge “perform[] any judicial act in which his 
personal interests are involved.” CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canons 13, 29 (1924). 
145. McKoski, supra note 127, at 1930. 
146. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972), with MODEL 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007). Perhaps the most notable changes were made in 
the 1990 version of the Code, in which the ABA used gender-neutral language when 
referring to judges and consistently changed “should” to “shall” throughout the 
canons, to eliminate any possible confusion concerning the enforceability and 
applicability of the Code to all judges. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT (1972), with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990). Additionally, the 
1990 Code provided, in commentary, a test to determine whether there is an 
appearance of impropriety, which is “whether the conduct would create in 
reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial 
responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.” MODEL 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 cmt. (1990).
147. Am. Bar Ass’n Ctr. for Prof’l Responsibility, supra note 123.
148. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2011).
149. Id.
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integrity, the 2010 Code strives to maintain a high level of ethical 
behavior from each member of the American judiciary system.150
1. General Impropriety
The 2010 Code is separated into four discrete canons, each 
with its own distinct topic.151 The first canon warns of actual 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety for the judiciary.152
Rule 1.2, titled “Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary,” describes 
with slightly more clarity what a judge should do to avoid acting 
with impropriety.153 It states that “[a] judge shall act at all times in a 
manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, 
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”154 Though this 
canon is quite vague in its wording, the ABA has included comments 
from which judges are to construe what types of behaviors violate 
this particular rule.155 For instance, the fifth comment states that 
[a]ctual improprieties include violations of law, court rules or provisions 
of this Code. The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the 
conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge 
violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on 
the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a 
judge.156
While this comment still is quite broad, and despite that many 
hypothetical judicial actions can be imagined that would violate this 
rule, judges are provided with a better of sense of what behavior will 
prove to be troublesome and may lead to sanctions.157 For instance, 
the text specifically mentions that “violations of law” cause 
150. See generally id.
151. See generally id. The first canon focuses on avoiding judicial 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. Id. Canon 1. The second canon 
discusses the importance of judicial impartiality, competence, and diligence. Id.
Canon 2. The third canon considers “personal and extrajudicial activities” and the 
potential conflicts that these activities may cause. Id. Canon 3. Finally, the fourth 
canon promotes regulations for judicial campaigns in order to minimize any adverse 
effects these campaigns may have on the entirety of the judiciary. Id. Canon 4.
152. Id. Canon 1. Specifically, this canon states that “[a] judge shall uphold 
and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall 
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” Id. Canon 1, R. 1.2.
153. Id. Canon 1, R. 1.2.
154. Id.
155. See generally id.
156. Id. Canon 1, R. 1.2, cmt. 5.
157. Id. Canon 1, R. 1.2.
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impropriety and an appearance of impropriety for the entire 
judiciary.158 As such, “violations of law” can be behaviors for which 
sanctions are warranted, even if the activity is of seemingly minor 
consequence.159 Therefore, Judge Ciavarella, who inappropriately 
sentenced juveniles in order to receive significant compensation, 
could receive sanctions for racketeering and conspiracy under the 
standard set forth in the 2010 Code.160
Rule 1.3 expands on the previous rule by insisting that “[a] 
judge shall not abuse the prestige of [the] judicial office to advance 
the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or allow 
others to do so.”161 Though the comments for this rule focus 
primarily on barring the use of judicial letterhead to help advance the 
career of another162 and not using one’s position as a judge to avoid 
driving violations,163 the language of this rule is sufficiently vague so 
that other abuses of power would still likely violate this part of the 
Code.164 For instance, Judge Mireles’s action—ordering police 
officers to forcibly bring Waco into Judge Mireles’s courtroom—
would likely be in violation of Rule 1.3 of the 2010 Code.165
2. Judicial Bias
The second canon of the 2010 Code promotes the importance 
of impartiality, competence, and diligence within the judicial 
office.166 This single canon includes a total of sixteen rules, which 
range in titles and topics from “Impartiality and Fairness”167 and 
“Ensuring the Right to Be Heard”168 to “Decorum, Demeanor, and 
158. Id. Canon 1, R. 1.2, cmt. 5.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. 
161. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1, R. 1.3.
162. See id. Canon 1, R. 1.3 & cmt. 2.
163. See id. Canon 1, R. 1.3 & cmt. 1.
164. Id. Canon 1, R. 1.3.
165. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. It is also quite likely 
that Judge Mireles acted in violation of Rule 1.2 of the 2010 Code as well, if his 
actions were severe enough to be considered an assault. See MODEL CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1, R. 1.2.
166. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2. 
167. See id. Canon 2, R. 2.2 (expressing that “[a] judge shall uphold and 
apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially”).
168. See id. Canon 2, R. 2.6 (stating in part that “[a] judge shall accord to 
every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the 
right to be heard according to law”).
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Communication with Jurors”169 and “Disability and Impairment.”170
Rules 2.2 and 2.3, however, deal with judicial bias and the negative 
aspects that bias can have on the judiciary.171
Rule 2.3, “Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment,” explores the 
responsibilities of judges to act without bias in all judicial affairs.172
This rule, in part, states “[a] judge shall not, in the performance of 
judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or 
engage in harassment . . . and shall not permit court staff, court 
officials, or others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do 
so.”173 The comment section for this rule further develops what type 
of behavior Rule 2.3 is intended to prohibit174 and describes the 
repercussions of judicial bias, prejudice, and harassment.175 Given 
the definitions of these disparaging acts provided in the comments, it 
is likely that Judge Stump’s stereotyping of Sparkman, which 
resulted in Judge Stump’s authorization to have Sparkman sterilized 
based upon her alleged “retardation,” would be in violation of Rule 
2.3 of the 2010 Code.176 Further, Judge Fisher, who exchanged 
insults with Bradley during a trial, would likely also be found to be 
in violation of this rule.177 Though Judge Stump’s and Judge Fisher’s 
actions were entirely dissimilar, the wording of Rule 2.3 of the 2010 
169. See id. Canon 2, R. 2.8 (exploring the significance of a judge being 
“patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, 
court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity”).
170. See id. Canon 2, R. 2.14 (instituting the requirement that, “[a] judge[,] 
having a reasonable belief that the performance of a lawyer or another judge is 
impaired by drugs or alcohol, or by a mental, emotional, or physical condition, shall 
take appropriate action”).
171. See id. Canon 2, RR. 2.2-.3.
172. Id. Canon 2, R. 2.3.
173. Id.
174. Id. Canon 2, R. 2.3, cmt. 2. This rule provides examples that include 
“epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor 
based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; . . . irrelevant 
references to personal characteristics. . . . A judge must avoid conduct that may 
reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.” Id.
175. Id. Canon 2, R. 2.3, cmt. 1 (stating that “[a] judge who manifests bias or 
prejudice in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the 
judiciary into disrepute”). 
176. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. Because Judge Stump 
simply took McFarlin’s declaration of Sparkman’s mental capacity as true, without 
meeting with Sparkman or investigating the matter any further, Judge Stump’s 
actions could be considered stereotypical and prejudicial against someone with 
alleged mental inhibitions. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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Code is sufficiently broad to include a substantial number of 
inappropriate judicial activities.178
In addition to prohibiting bias, prejudice, and harassment, the 
second canon also prohibits excessive external influences that impact 
the conduct of judges.179 Rule 2.4, “External Influences on Judicial 
Conduct,” states in part that “[a] judge shall not permit family, 
social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to 
influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.”180 Further, once 
again stressing the importance of public appearances,181 Rule 2.4 
insists that “[a] judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the 
impression that any person or organization is in a position to 
influence the judge.”182 Unfortunately, however, this language does 
not appear to be strong enough because judges still violate Rule 
2.4.183 An obvious example of this is Judge Ciavarella.184 Despite 
Rule 2.4’s strict stance on the avoidance of external influence, Judge 
Ciavarella was sufficiently influenced by Powell to send thousands 
of juveniles to detention facilities in order to make a personal 
profit.185
3. Extrajudicial Financial Compensation
The third canon of the 2010 Code states that “[a] judge shall 
conduct the judge’s personal and extrajudicial activities to minimize 
the risk of conflict with the obligations of judicial office.”186 This 
portion of the Code includes fifteen specific rules, which range in 
topic and title from “Testifying as a Character Witness”187 and 
“Appointments to Governmental Positions”188 to “Affiliation with 
178. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, R. 2.3.
179. Id. Canon 2, R. 2.4.
180. Id.
181. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
182. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2, R. 2.4.
183. See, e.g., supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. 
184. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
186. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3.
187. Id. Canon 3, R. 3.3 (expressing that “[a] judge shall not testify as a 
character witness in a judicial, administrative, or other adjudicatory proceeding or 
otherwise vouch for the character of a person in a legal proceeding, except when 
duly summoned”).
188. Id. Canon 3, R. 3.4 (stating that “[a] judge shall not accept appointment 
to a governmental committee, board, commission, or other governmental position, 
unless it is one that concerns the law, the legal system, or the administration of 
justice”).
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Discriminatory Organizations”189 and “Practice of Law.”190 Rules 
3.12 and 3.13, though, are focused on financial restrictions for 
judges.191
Rule 3.12, “Compensation for Extrajudicial Activities,” limits 
the ability of judges to be compensated for activities done outside of 
their judiciary duties.192 Specifically, this rule states “[a] judge may 
accept reasonable compensation for extrajudicial activities permitted 
by this Code or other law unless such acceptance would appear to a 
reasonable person to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, 
or impartiality.”193 Though the comments provide limited guidance 
as to what types of compensation are reasonable,194 this rule leaves 
open the opportunity for many types of inappropriate 
compensation.195
Further, Rule 3.13, “Acceptance and Reporting of Gifts, Loans, 
Bequests, Benefits, or Other Things of Value,” limits the gifts that 
can be received by judges, particularly from individuals not part of 
the judge’s family.196 In part, this rule states “[a] judge shall not 
accept any gifts . . . or other things of value, if acceptance is 
prohibited by law or would appear to a reasonable person to 
undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality.”197
These gifts have been defined to include a multitude of items—
“rewards and prizes”;198 “commercial or financial opportunities and 
benefits”;199 and “scholarships, fellowships, and similar benefits or 
189. Id. Canon 3, R. 3.6 (affirming in part that “[a] judge shall not hold
membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis 
of race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, or sexual orientation”). 
190. Id. Canon 3, R. 3.10 (“A judge shall not practice law. A judge may act 
pro se and may, without compensation, give legal advice to and draft or review 
documents for a member of the judge’s family, but is prohibited from serving as the 
family member’s lawyer in any forum.”).
191. See generally id. Canon 3, RR. 3.12-.13.
192. Id. Canon 3, R. 3.13.
193. Id.
194. The first comment states in part that “[a] judge is permitted to accept 
honoraria, stipends, fees, wages, salaries, royalties, or other compensation for 
speaking, teaching, writing, and other extrajudicial activities, provided the 
compensation is reasonable and commensurate with the task performed.” Id. Canon 
3, R. 3.12, cmt. 1.
195. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
196. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3, R. 3.13.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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awards”200—if these gifts are unavailable to individuals who are not 
judges.201 Further, this rule also prohibits the giving of these same 
types of gifts to a judge’s “spouse, . . . domestic partner, or other 
family member . . . residing in the judge’s household.”202 By 
providing so many examples of what constitutes inappropriate gifts,
the ABA has made this rule somewhat narrower than others.203
However, this rule still protects against many possible situations of 
undue influence upon the judiciary.204
By stating a vast number of broad rules, the ABA has been able 
to create a straightforward set of guidelines to hold judges 
responsible for many irresponsible and inappropriate acts that may 
bring a negative stigma to the judiciary as a whole.205 However, by 
merely creating the list and asking the states to enforce the 
regulations, the ABA is looking the other way, as judges are still able 
to harm the general public.206 In order for judges to adhere to these 
guidelines, individual states must enforce the guidelines much more 
stringently, starting perhaps with the removal of protection by 
absolute judicial immunity if the regulations put forth by the Code 
are ignored.207
III. THE NEED TO RECONSIDER ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Although there are a number of restrictions placed on judges
with the hope of enticing them to act ethically,208 these regulations
are simply not severe enough to have any sizeable impact. Judges 
like Judge Ciavarella, Judge Stump, and Judge Mireles are 
continuing to act without regard for the general public.209 Until 
judges feel more accountable to the public they serve, these trends 
are likely to continue.210 Judge Ciavarella’s criminal activities in 
particular, which continued until he was exposed in 2008, indicate 
200. Id.
201. See generally id.
202. Id. As stated in the comments, this is to reduce the opportunity for the 
public to believe the family member is receiving the gift only “to evade Rule 3.13 
and influence the judge indirectly.” Id. Canon 3, R. 3.13, cmt. 4.
203. Compare id. Canon 3, R. 3.13, with id. Canon 2, R. 2.3.
204. See id. Canon 3, R. 3.13.
205. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.
206. See supra Section I.B.
207. See infra Part III.
208. See supra Section II.B.
209. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text; see supra Section I.B.
210. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text; see supra Section I.B.
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that the propensity of some judges to prioritize their personal desires
and benefits above the rights and privileges of the public they serve 
still continues today.211 While Judge Ciavarella’s actions cannot and 
should not be considered characteristic of all judges by any means,
his ability to act with complete disregard for so many juveniles over 
the course of so many years should serve as a warning that the 
standing regulations are simply not working as effectively as 
necessary.212
Rather than a blanket immunity that protects judges from every 
judicial act taken, judicial immunity should be limited to only protect 
judges from civil litigation in certain situations.213 In order to show 
that absolute judicial immunity should apply, the judge would need 
to show that he did not act in such a way that he could be sanctioned 
or that he did not act with malice.214 If either of these requirements 
were met, a judge would still be protected by judicial immunity, and 
the plaintiff would not be able to bring suit against the judge for his 
alleged action.215 If, however, the judge is unable to show that he did 
not act in such a way that he could be sanctioned and cannot show 
that he did not act with malice, the judge should not be able to assert 
judicial immunity, and the plaintiff should be able to bring a civil 
suit against the judge.216 This restructuring of judicial immunity 
would help retain protection for judges in most situations, but would 
provide an opportunity for civil recourse for individuals most 
seriously harmed by the acts of a judge.217 Though this solution 
certainly would not provide every individual injured by a judge’s 
actions with monetary relief, it would present a starting point for 
holding judges more accountable for their actions, without foregoing 
all of the policy considerations that have kept absolute judicial 
immunity in existence for centuries.218
A. An Exception to Absolute Judicial Immunity
In order to fairly compensate those individuals who have been 
victimized by inappropriate and egregious judicial behavior, absolute 
211. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
213. See infra Section III.A.
214. See infra Subsections III.A.1-2.
215. See infra Section III.A.
216. See infra Section III.A.
217. See infra Section III.A.
218. See infra Section III.B.
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judicial immunity should be modified to include an exception to 
provide for situations in which the immunity would not apply.219 By 
structuring this exception very narrowly, most judges would still 
receive full immunity for all judicial activities. However, judges who 
complete acts that result in, or could result in, sanctions and who 
have a clearly malicious intent would lose the immunity, leaving 
these judges liable for civil damages. In order to compensate 
individuals most grievously harmed by judges, the evaluation to 
determine whether a judge should lose the ability to assert judicial 
immunity would center on two mandatory elements. First, the 
alleged activity must be a sanctionable action under the state or 
federal version of the Code.220 Second, the plaintiff would need to 
show sufficient facts in her complaint that could lead to a finding 
that the judge acted with malicious intent.221 If the plaintiff can show 
preliminary facts that satisfy both of these elements and the judge 
cannot disprove either element, then the judge responsible for the 
egregious action would be unable to assert absolute immunity and 
would instead have to proceed with the civil suit, which could 
ultimately result in the judge being civilly liable to the plaintiff.222
1. Sanctionable Activity
The first element would require that the judge’s alleged activity 
be one for which the judge could be sanctioned under the federal or 
state judicial regulations.223 Because the ABA has provided a 
thorough and complete Code that has been adapted and adopted by 
each state,224 this element would be quite straightforward. By 
requiring an element that considers whether sanctions could be 
asserted, the legitimacy of the claims brought against judges would 
be ensured.225 If the alleged activity was not sufficient to warrant 
219. See supra text accompanying notes 213-18.
220. See infra Subsection III.A.1.
221. See infra Subsection III.A.2.
222. See infra Subsection III.A.3.
223. Of course, federal regulations would apply to federal judges and state 
regulations would apply to state judges.
224. See supra Section II.B. Though state versions of the Code do vary, the 
general theme of avoiding impropriety and the appearance of impropriety is 
consistent through each.
225. Though frivolous lawsuits could occur against judges in a small number 
of situations, the sanctionable conduct requirement would ensure that parties ruled 
against by the judge do not subsequently bring civil claims against the judge for 
their loss.
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sanctions, then it would also not be sufficient to warrant civil 
liability.
However, the ABA’s Code illustrates many situations where 
sanctions are warranted, but the judicial actions are likely not 
sufficiently egregious to warrant civil liability.226 For instance, Rule 
1.3 discusses abuse of judicial power and authority.227 If a judge were 
to use his influence to avoid receiving a speeding ticket,228 this 
behavior likely should not warrant a civil suit against the judge.229
For this reason, the second element of this test, proof of malicious 
intent, becomes necessary. If the judge received sanctions and also 
acted with malice, then civil liability would much more likely be 
appropriate.
Additionally, if there was not a clearly identifiable individual 
victimized by the judge’s actions, civil recourse also would be 
unnecessary. In the driving violation example, an individual could 
not claim to be victimized simply because a judge did not receive a 
speeding ticket.230 In this circumstance, the judge, who could still
perhaps be sanctioned under Rule 1.3,231 would not be liable for civil 
damages to any individual.
Finally, the sanctions would have to be warranted for a judicial 
action taken by the judge. Rather than discriminating between an act 
taken in excess of jurisdiction and an act in clear absence of all 
jurisdiction, as the American judiciary has traditionally done,232 any 
action that warrants sanctions that is taken while the judge is acting 
in his judicial capacity would be relevant activity for this test. This, 
therefore, would eliminate the opportunity for civil liability for a 
judge who uses his position of power to escape a speeding ticket233
because this action likely would not occur while a judge was acting 
226. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
227. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1, R. 1.3 (2011).
228. Id. Canon 1, R. 1.3, cmt. 1.
229. Though judges are not supposed to use their authority to avoid things 
like speeding tickets and although judges could be sanctioned for this type of action, 
civil suits in situations such as this hypothetical one would waste court time and 
resources. This proposal is merely intended for egregious acts by judges, particularly 
those that actually harm a member of the public or the public as a whole.
230. See supra text accompanying note 228. Though an individual may feel 
the judge is receiving unfair bias due to his or her position in the judiciary, this 
would not be sufficient to warrant suit. The plaintiff bringing suit against a judge 
must be injured in such a way that damages are appropriate.
231. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
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in his judicial capacity. However, Judge Mireles, who used his 
position of power to order the police officers to forcibly bring Waco 
to Judge Mireles’s courtroom, was acting in his judicial capacity and 
therefore would be liable for civil recourse to Waco under this 
proposed test if Waco could show malicious intent.234
Therefore, while not all judges who are sanctioned should also 
be liable for civil damages, having a requirement that the judge’s 
alleged activity warrants sanctions would be overwhelmingly 
fruitful. Some judges, however, would still be immune under this 
standard, even though they likely should be held civilly liable as 
well. For instance, Judge Stump, at the time he approved Sparkman’s 
tubal ligation, did not act in such a way that he could be sanctioned 
because state law gave him the authority to consider and sign the 
petition for sterilization.235 Because of this, he could not be 
sanctioned for his actions and would not be liable for civil damages 
under this structure. While this limitation on absolute judicial 
immunity will not protect every individual who likely should receive 
damages from judges who act inappropriately, allowing judges to be 
civilly liable for sanctionable actions taken within their judicial role 
for which malicious intent can be proved would be a substantial first 
step in protecting the general public.
2. Malicious Intent
The second element of the test to determine whether or not a 
judge should be protected by absolute judicial immunity for her 
action focuses on the judge’s intent when the act was completed. If 
the judge acted with a malicious intent, then the judge should not be 
protected by judicial immunity. This proposition is not novel, as it 
was considered in the first few cases involving absolute judicial 
immunity in the United States.236 In Randall, the Court had left open 
the idea that a judge could perhaps lose her absolute immunity if she 
acted in complete absence of jurisdiction and acted with malicious 
234. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. After Sparkman’s case was 
heard, Indiana created a statute prohibiting instances of parental sterilization, except 
in extremely specific circumstances. Therefore, if Judge Stump were to act in the 
same manner today, it is likely that he would be sanctioned for his actions and, if 
malice could be proven, he could also be liable for civil damages if this suggested 
model were adopted.
236. See supra Section I.A.
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intent.237 However, in Bradley, the Supreme Court dismissed this 
suggestion and determined that intent could never be a factor in 
determining whether a judge should receive immunity from her 
actions.238 The Court in Bradley asserted that individuals who were 
upset by the judge’s actions could nearly always allege malice 
against the judge and that the possibility that maliciousness could be 
associated with a judge would be unfair and unwarranted.239
This fear of inappropriate accusations of malice, while still 
valid, is not nearly as forceful today as it was in 1872 when Bradley
was decided.240 In the 2007 decision of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly241 and the 2009 decision of Ashcroft v. Iqbal,242 the 
Supreme Court outlined an updated procedure to ensure that all 
allegations of malice were verified, at least to some degree, before a 
case reached trial. In these two cases, the Supreme Court adapted the 
notice-pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
to ensure that a party’s allegation of malice would be substantiated 
once discovery had been undertaken.243 Put another way, a party 
could not bring a claim for malice without showing a sufficient 
factual basis in the initial complaint to allow a reasonable conclusion 
that the claim for evidence would be substantiated after the discovery 
period had lapsed.244 If it was determined that the party’s claim was 
unwarranted and that the party did not have enough factual 
background to make this claim, the judge would have the ability to 
have the lawsuit dismissed immediately.245 This new standard would 
help ensure that parties do not raise superficial claims that the judge 
acted with malice, thereby protecting the judges who have not acted 
inappropriately.246
3. Implications of the New Standard of Judicial Immunity
By considering malice, individuals will be more adequately 
protected from judges who act with complete disregard for the good 
of the public. For example, Judge Ciavarella, by accepting money in 
237. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
240. See generally 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
241. 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
242. 556 U.S. 662, 677-81 (2009).
243. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-81.
244. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-81.
245. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-81.
246. Interview with Philip Pucillo, supra note 27.
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exchange for trafficking children into juvenile facilities, was 
arguably acting maliciously, as he prioritized his own financial well-
being above the welfare of the juveniles entrusted to his care.247
Therefore, under this proposed test, Judge Ciavarella would likely 
satisfy both elements, as he participated in an activity within his 
judicial capacity for which he could be sanctioned, and he acted with 
malicious intent. If this test were enacted, children like Hillary 
Transue would be able to bring a civil suit against Judge Ciavarella 
and could perhaps recover financially from him as well, which would 
likely provide at least some closure from the horrible situation they 
were forced to endure.248
This standard likely would not have helped Sparkman recover 
from Judge Stump, as Judge Stump likely did not act with malice.249
Though Judge Stump did not use his better judgment in permitting 
Sparkman to undergo the tubal ligation procedure without first 
consulting with Sparkman herself or another witness who could have 
corroborated McFarlin’s petition, there is no proof that Judge Stump 
acted maliciously by signing the petition.250 As such, even though 
Sparkman was permanently scarred from Judge Stump’s actions, 
Sparkman would not be able to recover civil damages from Judge 
Stump, even under this suggested model.
It is unclear as to whether Judge Mireles could be held civilly 
liable to Waco if this test were enacted, as the Mireles opinion does 
not adequately describe Judge Mireles’s thoughts when he ordered 
two police officers to forcibly bring Waco into Judge Mireles’s 
courtroom.251 It would likely be difficult for Waco to give adequate 
background facts to show that Judge Mireles acted with malice 
before the discovery phase of the trial began, which would cause 
problems for Waco in bringing a civil claim.252 If Waco could show 
that Judge Mireles acted with malice, by discriminating against 
Waco specifically or by ordering an excessive amount of force to be 
247. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. This disregard was 
evidenced in a number of ways, including his refusal to recommend that juveniles 
retain counsel for their hearings. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
248. See supra notes 1-3, 12-13 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text. Though the higher 
standard set by the Court in Twombly and Iqbal would make it difficult for Waco to 
satisfy the requirements of the initial pleadings, the overall benefit that this higher 
standard would have on preventing frivolous lawsuits against the judiciary is still 
beneficial. 
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used on Waco, then Waco’s claim would likely be substantiated, and 
the case could proceed. 
By considering whether a judge has committed actions 
sufficiently egregious to warrant sanctions while acting in his or her 
position within the judiciary and by considering whether the judge 
acted with a malicious intention, more individuals severely harmed 
by the misdeeds of judges would be able to recover civil damages for 
their claims. While this solution would not provide civil recourse to 
every individual victimized by a judge’s inappropriate behavior, it 
would certainly provide a starting point from which judges could be 
liable for their actions.
B. Policy Considerations
There are three primary policy arguments made in favor of 
absolute judicial immunity.253 First, absolute immunity prevents 
deterrence from government service.254 The absolute immunity 
provides a protection to judges from frivolous lawsuits for decisions 
made behind the bench.255 If the immunity were discarded altogether, 
the best judicial candidates could become disinterested in the 
position for fear of numerous personal lawsuits, excessive personal 
liability, and possible payment of damages. Second, absolute 
immunity prevents inhibition in the performance of judicial 
functions.256 Because judges are granted immunity for any and all 
decisions made when acting in a judicial capacity, judges do not 
need to second guess their decisions or have a fear of reprisal for 
making a controversial decision.257 Third, absolute immunity 
prevents distractions in performance of judicial functions.258 Judges 
need not be concerned about missing work or being distracted while 
presiding over a case by their own personal lawsuits occurring at the 
same time.259 Absolute judicial immunity not only provides 
protection from paying civil damages to individuals victimized by 
the judge’s behavior, but also keeps the entire case from going to 
trial in the first place.260 While each of these policy considerations is 
253. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
254. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
260. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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legitimate and important, providing civil recourse to individuals 
victimized by abhorrent judicial acts should not be prohibited, 
particularly in situations where a judge can be sanctioned for her 
judicial misconduct and the plaintiff can show that the judge acted 
with a malicious intent.261
The first policy argument contemplates the importance of not 
deterring eligible individuals from serving as a judge.262 As our 
judiciary relies extensively on the judges themselves, it is of the 
utmost importance to our society that the best individuals are chosen 
to become judges and that strong candidates are not deterred from 
the position due to the ability to be civilly liable for decisions made 
in a judicial capacity.263 However, by limiting absolute judicial 
immunity, by considering whether the alleged actions were 
sanctionable and were completed with a malicious intent, judicial 
candidates will not be deterred from service completely. Rather, 
judicial candidates, and judges themselves, will be deterred from 
acting with malice while performing judicial duties. This is a 
significant distinction because the American judicial system will not 
lose potentially excellent judges. Rather, this adjustment will 
reinforce the notion that a judge must act fairly and without malice 
when making his decisions. 
The second policy consideration centers on the need to prevent 
judicial inhibition.264 In order for judges to make appropriate
decisions, it is necessary that the judges feel uninhibited when 
considering the cases before them, especially when the case is 
controversial in some way.265 If judges were to worry extensively 
about the impact of their decisions on the public and any retribution 
that the judges may receive for their decisions, judges would likely 
be tempted to choose a less controversial solution, which would 
hinder judicial progress.266 Judicial inhibition would be immensely 
261. See supra Section III.A.
262. See supra text accompanying note 26.
263. See supra text accompanying note 26.
264. See supra text accompanying note 28.
265. See supra text accompanying note 28.
266. For instance, if Justice Blackmun, in writing the Court’s opinion for 
Roe v. Wade in 1973, had worried about public outcry concerning the Court’s
decision, he may have decided on a less controversial outcome. 410 U.S. 113
(1973). If Justice Blackmun had worried that he personally could be named as a 
party in a civil lawsuit by an individual claiming to be victimized by Justice 
Blackmun’s decision, he may have reconsidered voting with the majority on this 
case. However, because Justice Blackmun did not have to worry extensively about 
how the public’s view of the decision would impact him personally, Justice 
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detrimental to the entirety of the judicial process, but the proposed 
limitation of absolute judicial immunity would only inhibit judges 
from specifically acting with malice while performing judicial 
functions.267 As such, the policy consideration of averting judicial 
inhibition would be simply tenuous and quite irrelevant if absolute 
judicial immunity were to include this proposed exception of judicial 
immunity.
The final policy argument attests that judges should be 
distracted from their judicial duties as infrequently as possible.268
While it is certainly true that the American judiciary system 
functions much more effectively and efficiently when the judges are 
able to perform their jobs with minimal outside distraction, this 
benefit should not overpower the right of individuals to recover 
damages if a judge has victimized them. Lawsuits are an 
undoubtedly long process, and it is certainly reasonable that a judge 
who is acting within his judicial role while also preparing for a 
lawsuit of his own will be distracted and overworked. However, due 
to the new procedural regulations put in place by Twombly269 and 
Iqbal,270 if a party’s assertion against a judge is not sufficiently 
substantiated by evidence before the trial is even to begin, the 
lawsuit will be dismissed immediately.271 Therefore, the strength of 
this final policy consideration is substantially outweighed by the 
need to protect innocent members of the public from abhorrent acts 
by judges.
CONCLUSION
Absolute judicial immunity should be reconsidered in order to 
ensure that the purpose and benefit of the immunity is still 
recognizable in the current state of the judiciary. Absolute judicial 
Blackmun was able to carefully weigh all of the arguments heard by the Court and 
write an opinion that, while controversial, expressed the beliefs of the Court.
267. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. Because Justice Blackmun 
was not acting maliciously, had this proposed regulation been in place, he still 
would not have been inhibited in making his decision in Roe. 410 U.S. at 116-17.
The proposed regulation would not have affected Justice Blackmun’s decision 
whatsoever, therefore enforcing the idea that judicial inhibition would be of no 
greater consequence if absolute judicial immunity were restructured to include this 
proposed limitation.
268. See supra text accompanying note 29.
269. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
270. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-81 (2009).
271. See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
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immunity should be limited so that judges are only civilly liable if 
their actions are severe enough to warrant sanctions and the 
victimized party can show malicious intent on the part of the judge. 
If this standard is met, the plaintiff should be able to bring a civil suit 
against the offending judge and perhaps receive damages for her 
ordeal if she were to win the case. This proposed exception to 
absolute judicial immunity, in this small realm of pertinent 
situations, would not impede the policy considerations for absolute 
judicial immunity that have been well established. Rather, the 
limitation of judicial immunity would ensure that each and every 
judge lives up to his oath as a public servant. If judges were held 
more accountable for their actions while serving on the bench, then 
Hillary Transue, and individuals like her, would likely not have 
faced the harsh reality of a judge who prioritized his own desires 
ahead of the rest of the population he took an oath to serve.272
272. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.

